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Currently the majority of medical negligence claims are based 
inter alia on an allegation that the doctor failed to procure the 
patient's informed consent. Therapeutic privilege is an 
important defence to allegations of non- or inadequate 
disclosure where the circumstances had warranted its 
invocation. 
Any form of medical intervention requires a patient's 
informed consent unless other grounds of justification exist, 
such as statutory authority, necessity, authorised 
administration, authorisation by the court, waiver and 
therapeutic privilege.
1 
A recognised exception to the required 
consent is the so-called therapeutic privilege whereby a 
medical practitioner may at his/her discretion withhold 
information from a patient with regard to the diagnosis or 
nature of the proposed treatment and the risks involved, when 
the practitioner is of the opinion that the patient's state of mind 
is such that full awareness of the gravity and severity of his 
condition or the drastic nature of the treatment indicated could 
be therapeutically detrimental to such a degree that his 
recovery may be prejudiced.' 
However 'little documentation exists for claims that 
informing patients is more dangerous to their health than not 
informing them, particularly when the informing is done in a 
sensitive and tactful fashion. On the contrary there is much to 
suggest that therapeutic privilege has been vastly overused as 
an excuse for not informing patients of acts they are entitled to 
know.'' 
The nature of the defence 
The defence of therapeutic privilege includes diagnosis and 
treatment. There is no general duty on a medical practitioner to 
divulge his diagnosis to the patient unless it is an express or an 
implied term of the agreement between the medical 
practitioner and the patient that he or she must be informed of 
the diagnosis: Failure to disclose a diagnosis to a patient may, 
however, constitute negligence if necessary and appropriate 
treatment is not administered timeously because of this.
1 
Where a patient consents to a diagnostic intervention 
conditional upon disclosure of diagnosis, non-disclosure 
vitiates prior consent and puts paid to a defence of therapeutic 
privilege. In cases where information on diagnosis is material 
lf1il to the patient's decision to subject himself to an intervention, 
there will obviously be a duty to disclose, subject to the 
medical practitioner's therapeutic privilege. Therapeutic non-
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disclosure would be especially appropriate where psychiatric 
illness is diagnosed. The medical practitioner should be under 
a duty to reveal the diagnosis under circumstances where non-
disclosure may cause the patient physical or psychological 
harm. A therapeutic duty to warn will rule out therapeutic 
privilege as a defence. 
The following instances should be recognised as exceptions 
or restrictions to the medical practitioner's general duty to 
disclose in respect of treatment, namely if: (z) full disclosure 
could be life-threatening to the patient or could detrimentally 
affect his physical or psychological welfare; (ii) full disclosure 
might influence the patient's decision-making to such a degree 
that it may prevent him from coming to a rational decision; (iii) 
full disclosure would possibly cause such anxiety and distress 
that it may jeopardise the final outcome of the proposed 
medical intervention; (iv) the patient is moribund and full 
disclosure would be insensitive or inhuman; (v) disclosure 
could seriously prejudice third parties; or (vi) the risks of full 
disclosure equal or exceed the dangers of the proposed 
intervention or treatment.' 
The psychological profile of the patient 
The psychological profile of the patient plays the most 
important role when evaluating the possible consequences of 
full disclosure on an already compromised patient. The Federal 
Supreme Court in Germany, for example, recognised just one 
situation where disclosure may be restricted and that is in the 
context of psychiatry and psychotherapy, where it was argued 
that in such circumstances the subjective nature of the 
patient/therapist relationship militates against disclosure.' 
Should the clinical assessment of the patient's psychological 
status on presentation indicate that full disclosure may result in 
adverse effects, the practitioner is advised to 'test' the patient 
by initially imparting information of a general nature in a 
sensitive and compassionate fashion to evaluate the patient's 
understanding and emotional reaction to these facts. The 
effects on the patient of the medical history and disclosures of 
other medical practitioners who are also involved with the 
treatment or management, are also relevant. 
The patient's unusual susceptibility to anxiety should be 
clinically assessed and clearly recorded in the doctor's medical 
records. There should be a direct correlation between the 
nature of the intervention or diagnosis and the extent of the 
non-disclosure. A more serious diagnosis or intervention 
should pose a higher risk or threat of psychological or physical 
harm to the patient and will be an important factor for the 
court to evaluate when it considers the reasonableness of the 
non-disclosure. The onus of proving a non-disclosure rests on 
the patient in civil actions and on the state in criminal 
prosecutions. The defence of therapeutic privilege in civil 
actions will have to be pleaded and proved by the medical 
practitioner involved. 
The medical practitioner's clinical 
records 
To comply with the ethical guidelines with regard to clinical 
note keeping and to record the fact that the doctor applied 
therapeutic privilege, the following should be contemp-
oraneously and carefully documented in the clinical notes: (i) 
details of the patient's history, psychological profile and clinical 
assessment; (ii) the nature of the diagnosis or disease, its course 
and prognosis; (iii) the material risks and/ or complications 
associated with the treatment envisaged and the risks that will 
remain undisclosed; (iv) the extent and reasons for the non-
disclosure; and (v) the nature of the harm and the detrimental 
effect that the medical practitioner recognised and sought to 
avoid. 
These records will constitute prima facie proof of the medical 
practitioner's reasons for non-disclosure and could neutralise 
an allegation or inference that invocation of the exception is an 
invention employed by the practitioner to escape non-
disclosure liability. 
The utility of disclosure documents 
Van Oosten' is of the opinion that consent forms cannot serve 
as a meaningful substitute for a disclosure conversation. He 
states that 'a disclosure conversation is better suited than 
document disclosure to realize the ideal of a so-called 
therapeutic alliance in health care, which denotes shared 
decision making between doctor and patient and, hence, a 
reconciliation and collaboration between the parties.' 
When determining whether or not the medical practitioner's 
non-disclosure was reasonable under the circumstances the 
court should consider expert medical evidence in respect of the 
risks and dangers of the particular diagnosis or intervention, 
the disease or complaint and its prognosis, the testimony of the 
medical practitioner relating to his clinical assessment of the 
patient at the time of non-disclosure, his reasons for non-
disclosure, and the nature and extent of the non-disclosure. The 
evidence of the patient relating to the disclosure consultation, 
the patient's subjective feelings in this regard and expert 
evidence relating to the patient's psychological profile will also 
be important. The ultimate question is whether the medical 
practitioner's conduct conformed to the standard of reasonable 
care demanded by the law. It is a question for the court to 
decide and cannot be delegated to the medical profession or a 
group in the community.' 
In the Australian case of Battersby v. Tottman
9 
the court 
upheld a defence of therapeutic privilege on the grounds that 
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the information as to the risk associated with the intended 
procedure was withheld because it could actually cause 
physical or mental harm to the patient. It was found that Dr 
Tottman understood the patient's mental and emotional 
condition to be of such a nature that he had to make the 
decision regarding the proposed therapy on her behalf. 
A distinction should be drawn between circumstances in 
which a decision is made on behalf of the patient because of 
the patient's mental infirmity, and circumstances in which a 
medical practitioner withholds information from a patient 
regarding the attendant risks associated with a proposed 
intervention so as to facilitate a patient's consent. In the latter 
case the patient still makes the decision to undergo the 
intervention although the consent is not 'informed' with regard 
to the information that was not disclosed. In the former 
instance the doctor makes the decision on behalf of the patient 
because the patient lacks the necessary capacity. However, it is 
submitted that the doctor's therapeutic privilege should also be 
extended to accommodate circumstances in which a patient 
becomes so ill or emotionally distraught on disclosure that it 
may foreclose a rational decision from the patient. The 
distinction between mental incapacity and emotional instability 
of this nature may be very fine and aggravate the troublesome 
nature of the defence. 
Recommendations 
The following principles are recommended for acceptance and 
application in the South African context: (i) non- or inadequate 
disclosure can only be justified in exceptional circumstances; 
(ii) there must be a real threat of detriment to a patient's 
physical or mental health; (iii) information may be withheld 
when the medical practitioner judges the patient's 
temperament or emotional state to be such as to be unable to 
make the information the basis of a rational decision; (iv) the 
medical practitioner bears the onus of proving that the non- or 
inadequate disclosure was based on sound clinical judgment; 
and (v) the legal, ethical and moral principles relating to the 
medical practitioner's therapeutic privilege should protect 
patient autonomy without unduly restricting medical 
judgment, with the object of achieving the best medical result 
for the patient. 
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